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This article will examine the representation of divine aseity in the Fourth Gospel, 
particularly as this is developed through a “divine name” christology that is 
intertwined with the “I am” sayings.  These sayings, which occur in both 
predicated and non-predicated form, together constitute one of the key devices by 
which the christology of the gospel is developed. While these are generally 
understood with reference to the statements of Isaiah 41:4 and 43:10, rather than 
Exodus 3:14, the ἐγώ εἰμι form has an affinity with reflections on the temporal 
significance of the divine name disclosed to Moses that are elsewhere attested in 
Jewish tradition. This recognition opens the possibility that the “I am” sayings, 
even as they identify Jesus with the God of Israel, are intended as reflections on 
the properly theological “problem” of the incarnation, on what it means for a God 
who transcends time to be enfleshed and particularized within it. This is to say that 
the Name christology at work is as significant for how John would have his 
readers think about the identity of God as it is for how they are to think about the 
identity of Jesus.  
 
The sayings render the identity of Jesus, as a human being located within time and 
place and whose substance is affected by these, as participating fully in the 
transcendent reality of God’s own being. By taking temporal form, the God who 
transcends time, and whose existence is entirely self-subsistent, unites it to his 
own being. The author plays upon the apparent paradox in ways that are visible in 
the text and that are linked to his conceptions of salvation. It is precisely the 
capacity to unite death to the divine life without the terminal conditions of human 
contingency that ensures that Jesus can be the source of life for all who receive 
him. Hence, salvation is linked to the ontology of God, as he is in himself, and 
Johannine christology must be articulated in such terms.   
 





Modern scholarship has rightly been attentive to the christological significance of the 
ἐγώ εἰμι sayings in the Fourth Gospel and the distinctive identification of Jesus that 
they constitute.1  It has been less attentive, however, to what we might label the 
                                                 
1  The most detailed engagements with the Johannine material are found in the 
monographs of David Mark Ball, “I Am” in John's Gospel: Literary Function, 
Background and Theological Implications (JSNT Supp 124. Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1996) and Catrin H. Williams, I am He: The Interpretation of ’Anî 
Hû in Jewish and Early Christian Literature (WUNT II: 113. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2000). Earlier and briefer discussions are found in Raymond E. Brown, The 
properly theological significance of the sayings and has, consequently, neglected 
some of the issues that can only be probed through the linguistic register of the 
theological discipline. Typically satisfied with a decision on whether, to what extent, 
or in which senses Jesus can be called “divine,” modern biblical scholarship has not 
for the most part engaged with the implications that this might have for how we 
understand God and his attributes and how, in turn, this might speak to our 
understanding of soteriology.2 I would suggest that this has led to a neglect of certain 
elements of Johannine soteriology, particularly those of a less functional and of a 
more ontologically grounded sort. This contrasts with pre-modern exegesis of the 
text,3 which was often concerned to probe the properly theological significance of the 
incarnation, particularly the way that the Gospel renders divine aseity, now 
understood as an attribute of a triune God that grounds the work of salvation. “I am” 
is precisely a co-identification and its force lies not simply in its radical claim to the 
divine status of Jesus, but in the creaturely particularity that is now seen to be part of 
the self-naming identity of the One God. For those familiar with the Scriptures on 
which ἐγώ εἰμι sayings draw, particularly if these are considered (contra some recent 
biblical scholarship) to include Exodus 3:14, the disruptive or disjunctional force of 
                                                                                                                                            
Gospel According to John (Anchor Bible Commentary. New York, Doubleday, 1966), 
533–38, Rudolf Schnackenburg, Das Johannesevangelium (HTKNT 4:II. Freiburg: 
Herder, 1971) 59–70 and Hans Klein, “Vorgeschichte und Verständnis der 
johanneischen Ich-bin-Worte,” Kerygma und Dogma 33 (1987), 120–36.   
Williams, I am He, 2–9, traces the details of the key research that lies behind these 
studies. Of these, we might note, in particular: Ethelbert Stauffer, Jesus: Gestalt und 
Geschichte (Bern: A. Francke, 1957), 130–46 & 167–72; Hans Zimmerman, “Das 
absolute Ἐγώ εἰμι als die neutestamentliche Offenbarungsformel,” BZ 4 (1960), 54–
69, 266–76, and “Das absolute ‘Ich bin’ in der Redeweise Jesu,” Trierer theologische 
Zeitschrift 69 (1960), 1–20; and Philip B. Harner, The “I Am” of the Fourth Gospel: 
A Study in Johannine Usage and Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970). 
Williams notes some key deficiencies in each study that her own seeks (successfully) 
to address. My own criticism is slightly different: all of the studies listed engage with 
the evidence in a diachronic fashion that avoids the use of later theological language 
such as aseity, and limits the conceptual lexicon of study to fragments or corollaries 
of the fuller concept.   
2 Richard Bauckham The Gospel of Glory: Major Themes in Johannine Theology 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2015) is an exception to this, but it does not deal with the 
category of aseity or with the concept of the divine attributes that are so important to 
earlier theological treatments of the gospel. 
3 The concept of aseity is prominent in, for example, Augustine’s Tractates on the 
Gospel of John (notably 22:8–10). From the period of transition into modernity, it is 
also a highly developed theme in Calvin’s commentary on John’s Gospel and, from 
this, in his systematic thought. For a discussion of this, see Brannon Ellis, Calvin, 
Classical Trinitarianism and the Aseity of the Son (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012).  Within modern scholarship on John, however, the theme is scarcely 
encountered. A telling exception is the excellent article by D. Jeffrey Bingham, 
“Christianizing Divine Aseity: Irenaeus Reads John,” in The Gospel of John and 
Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 53–67. Even in the volume in 
which it is published, which is attentive to theological matters, this is the only article 
that deals with the divine attributes in relation to the incarnation and it does so 
principally with reference to an interpreter, rather than to the text itself.   
the allusion is not simply that they are placed on the lips of Jesus, but that they are 
linked thereby to contextual details that would never previously be predicated of this 
God. This can only rightly be analyzed using the lexicon and grammar of theology 
proper, brought to the text with sensitivity to the soteriological move that is made 
therein. 
In this article, then, I want to explore some elements that have, I think, been 
overlooked by biblical scholarship. Specifically, I want to argue that the ἐγώ εἰμι 
sayings identify Jesus with the God who is theologically described as a se (“of 
himself”). The incarnational union that the gospel renders is one in which this divine 
aseity is united to creaturely contingency, sharing its sufficiency with that which is in 
itself insufficient, mediating eternal life to frail and sinful creatures. It thus roots the 
redemptive significance of the incarnation in the unique ontology of God himself, in 
what he distinctively is, and not just what he does. Such a presentation of salvation is 
widely found in theological accounts, 4  but is generally peripheral to biblical 
scholarship, which generally neglects the heuristic value of categories developed in 
later theology. At the same time, it requires us to understand divine aseity in positive 
and relational terms that are revealed in the gospel: it is as the one who is a se that 
God gives himself to the world in the incarnation.   
I will begin by offering some brief comments on aseity as a theological concept 
and reflecting on how these might relate to and inform the modern treatment of the 
ἐγώ εἰμι sayings. Once I have done this, I will trace some of the distinctive 
associations that are made in the Scriptures that serve as background to the sayings, 
noting in particular some of the textual co-ordinations that appear to have taken place 
in their transmission; these require us to keep the disclosure of the divine name in 
Exodus 3:14 in view, alongside the principal background of the Deuteronomic and 
Isaianic “I am he” sayings. This is well-trodden ground in scholarship, but my 
examination will approach the details with a subtly different question to the one 
commonly asked: not, “How do these details contribute to the representation of Jesus 
in the Fourth Gospel?” but “How do they prepare us for the representation of God in 
the Fourth Gospel?” By re-associating these concepts with a mortal being, whose 
personal narrative appears to involve a level of ontological contingency within the 
created order, the Gospel turns the challenge of conceptualizing the incarnation of the 
eternal, infinite God into a basis for soteriology. This will be studied in the third and 
fourth sections of the article, which will deal with John’s Gospel itself. 
  
 
1. On Aseity 
 
As is the case with most theological language, the term “aseity” has a wider 
philosophical usage, but for our purposes what matters is the theological usage of the 
word and what it seeks to name. At the most basic level, it articulates the truth that 
God is “of himself” or, to put this in slightly fuller terms, that “In every respect, God 
                                                 
4 As well as the works listed above, we might note the place of the concept in Barth’s 
Church Dogmatics. For a close examination of this, see Brian D. Asbill, The Freedom 
of God for Us: Karl Barth's Doctrine of Divine Aseity (London: Bloomsbury T&T 
Clark, 2016). 
is of himself God.”5 In positive terms, this is an affirmation of the perfection and 
plenitude of God but, as Webster notes, one of the immediate dangers that attends 
such an assertion is that it is effectively debased by setting it too quickly (or even 
exclusively) in contrast with its opposite, reducing it to its negative corollaries: God’s 
aseity means that his existence is non-contingent, but to describe God as non-
contingent is less than describing him as a se. Webster traces this distinctively modern 
“pathology” 6  through various treatments of the concept and identifies therein a 
loosing of aseity from its proper mooring in the identity of God and a reattachment to 
more abstract concepts of deity: aseity becomes part of a logical argument about 
existence (and the necessity of a first mover), rather than an assertion made about who 
the triune God is.  
 
Aseity becomes less an affirmation of the underived beauty and goodness of God, 
and more a property which must be ascribed to deitas if it is properly to fulfil its 
function of supporting the contingent.7        
 
Interestingly, as an echo of this, Webster notes that Schleiermacher (followed by 
Tillich) considered aseity to be nothing more than a combination of the notions of 
omnipotence and eternity;8 as we will see, the background to the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings is 
generally understood today in these very categories and it is important that we 
recognize them to fall short of the fuller classical notions of aseity. Instead, a proper 
treatment of the attribute “tries to indicate God’s identity; it is not a definition of God 
but a gesture towards God’s objective and self-expressive being.”9 
 As such, the theological traditions of both Judaism and Christianity have been 
deeply sensitive to the association between the concept of aseity and the various 
points in Scripture where some form of the expression “I am” is used as a statement 
precisely of divine identity.10 These involve an act of self-naming that asserts the 
uniqueness of God and the necessity of his being to the existence of other things, by 
communicating who God is. Despite occupying the foreground of discussion about 
aseity, the eternity of God and the contingency of other things upon his creative 
activity are really derivations from this central assertion of divine identity, rendered as 
contrasts to the creaturely realities of mortality and contingency. This asserts not just 
divine self-subsistence, but divine goodness; from his own fullness, God gives 
himself lovingly in creative, providential and redemptive activity. Because the one 
who names himself “I am” is, the cosmos is, and it is good (Genesis 1:31).11  
 Philo provides an interesting example of thinking about divine aseity that affirms 
the very points we have just outlined as features of early Jewish thought:   
 
                                                 
5 John B. Webster, “Life in and of Himself,” in his God Without Measure: Working 
Papers in Christian Theology. Volume 1: God and the Works of God (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 13–28. The quotation is taken from p.13. 
6 Webster, “Life in and of Himself,” 18. 
7 Webster, “Life in and of Himself,” 18. 
8 Webster, “Life in and of Himself,” 17.  
9 Webster, “Life in and of Himself,” 13. 
10 See Ellis, Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism and the Aseity of the Son, 202–04.  
11 Augustine is sensitive to this implication of aseity. See his De Doctrina Christiana, 
I:32, which reflects upon the giving of the divine name in Exodus 3:14: “Because he 
is good, we exist.”  
We all know that before the creation of the world, God was sufficient unto 
Himself, and that after the creation He remained the same, unchanged. Why then 
did he make the things that were not? Why, save because He was good and 
bountiful (Mut. 46).12  
 
This is noteworthy, for it highlights that the deployment of the concept in Jewish 
literature from the Second Temple period reflected this fuller, more positive and 
relational concept of aseity, rather than merely its logical negative derivations.13 This 
is all the more striking in the context of Philo’s writings, since he is so preoccupied 
with the philosophical or logical questions that attend talk of God. 
A significant adaptation occurs in Christian theology, though, as aseity comes to 
be articulated in trinitarian terms. John’s Gospel, and particularly the description of 
the Son as having life in himself (5:26) plays an important role in the theological 
traditions (see footnote 3, above), though one heavily debated.14 For our purposes, 
what is most significant about the shift is twofold. First, it reflects a fundamental 
conviction that if Jesus is identified not just “with” but “as” God, then the attributes of 
God considered intrinsic to his being must be sustained within the incarnation. This, 
obviously, creates conceptual or linguistic challenges: how are we to speak of one 
whose self-subsistent being transcends time and space becoming (John 1:14) finite 
mortal flesh? These challenges, however, become the grounds for both creational and 
soteriological reflection: in the union of the created and uncreated, the temporal and 
the eternal, the mortal and the immortal, lies the hope of eternal life.15 Second, it 
                                                 
12 The extract is discussed by Peter Frick, Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria 
(TSAJ 77. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 62. Interestingly, Frick also notes that in 
Legum Allegoriæ 3:73 the name “God” is attached particularly to the “goodness” 
ἀγαθότητος of the “cause of all” (i.e., First Cause).  
13 That such positive assertions of the concept are detectable in early Judaism and in 
the Scriptures of Old and New Testaments themselves is a thread running through 
Katherine Sonderegger’s sensitive Systematic Theology, Volume 1: The Doctrine of 
God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015).  
14 Ellis, Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism and the Aseity of the Son, in toto, engages 
with the debates around the significance of the Father’s granting the Son to have life 
in himself. Ellis himself constructively develops Calvin’s strong assertion of the Son’s 
aseity (197–226).     
15 This is not just a matter of eternal life as salvation, but more basically as the goal of 
creation. The words of Athanasius reflect this, and the place of Johannine vocabulary 
within these should not be overlooked: 
  
And the cause why the Word of God really came to created beings is truly 
wonderful, and shows that things should not have occurred otherwise than as 
they are. For the nature of created things, having come into being from 
nothing, is unstable, and is weak and mortal when considered by itself … 
 
… But being good, he governs and establishes the whole world through his 
Word who is himself God, in order that creation, illuminated by the 
leadership, providence, and ordering of the Word, Creation may be able to 
remain firm, since it shares in the Word who is truly from the Father and is 
aided by him to exist, and lest it suffer what would happen, I mean a relapse 
into non-existence, if it were not protected by the Word. (C.Gentes 3.41) 
presses the category of aseity back into the self-subsistence of a God now considered 
to enjoy an eternal internal fellowship; that is, it presses the category back into the 
eternal inner relations of Father, Son and Spirit. God’s sharing of himself with the 
cosmos—creatively, providentially and redemptively—is an overflowing of a perfect 
love that needs nothing beyond itself.    
 What does this mean for our engagement with the Fourth Gospel? Principally, it 
means that we have to be attentive to both the positive and the contrastive significance 
of aseity, as a concept; it is not simply non-contingency, or eternity understood in 
graded contrast to temporal vulnerability, but rather an underived fullness of life that 
is lovingly shared with a cosmos that can only ever enjoy life derivatively. 
Consequently, we need to be attentive to the personal and relational overtones to the 
ἐγώ εἰμι sayings and not just abstractly to the attributes of eternity or omnipotence of 
which they may speak. As we shall see, the contrast between the contingency or 
earthly elements and the non-contingency of the divine Son is important to the 
soteriology of the Fourth Gospel, but it is a contrast that emerges from more basic 
relationships. The relational overtones may reflect the communication of Father and 
Son—what the tradition would come to understand as belonging to the inner life of 
the Trinity—but also the communication of God’s underived life to the world. That is, 
the relational element is both immanent and economic.  
 
 
2. Backgrounds and Contexts.  
 
The ἐγώ εἰμι sayings that run through the Fourth Gospel occur in both predicated and 
unpredicated (absolute) forms and there is a general scholarly recognition that the two 
sets of sayings are intended as interlaced literary devices by the evangelist.16 This has 
been an important factor in the discussions about the backgrounds to these sayings, 
since any theory must be capable of explaining the absolute sayings, and not just the 
predicated ones. In other words, backgrounds must be identified that also deploy ἐγώ 
εἰμι in an absolute and non-predicated form. Consequently, scholars have typically 
seen the principal influence on the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings not in the revelation of the divine 
name in Exodus 3:14, where the phrase does not occur in absolute form, but in the use 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Translation, Robert Thompson, Athanasius: Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
 
In modern theology, the linked creational and soteriological significance of aseity, 
now understood with respect to the death of Jesus, is elaborated in Eberhard Jüngel, 
Gott als Geheimnis der Welt: zur Begründung der Theologie des Gekreuzigten im 
Streit zwischen Theismus und Atheismus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1977), 248–307. 
Jüngel represents perishability (Vergänglichkeit) as an ontological simile of 
“nothingness” (Nichts); God’s being is “Auch-sich-heraus-Gehen in das Nichts” 
(303). His going into death, then, becomes a creative act of victory, as his life is 
poured into the nothing from which he creates.      
16  This is really the core claim of Ball, “I Am” in John’s Gospel, articulated 
particularly on page 15.  
of ἐγώ εἰμι in Deuteronomy 32:39 and at a number of points in Isaiah, notably 43:10, 
46:4, and a number of further texts in Deutero-Isaiah,17 where it translates אוה ינא (and 
in some cases הוהי ינא). It is worth probing this a little further, however, as a closer 
examination suggests that in the Scriptures and traditions the Gospel draws upon, 
there was some coordination of the Deuteronomic and Isaianic sayings with the divine 
name.  
Technically, the occurrence of ἐγώ εἰμι in Exodus 3:14 is predicated by the title ὁ 
ὤν, which renders the second occurrence of היהא, in the famous articulation of the 
divine identity, היהא רשא היהא. 
 
 םכילא ינחלש היהא לארשי ינבל רמאת הכ רמאיו היהא רשא היהא השמ לא םיהלא רמאיו 
 
καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς πρὸς Μωυσῆν Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν· καὶ εἶπεν Οὕτως ἐρεῖς τοῖς υἱοῖς 
Ισραηλ Ὁ ὢν ἀπέσταλκέν με πρὸς ὑμᾶς. 
 
God said to Moses, “I AM WHO I AM.” He said further, “Thus you shall say to 
the Israelites, ‘I AM has sent me to you.’” (Ex 3:14) 
 
Deuteronomy 32:39 and the various Isaiah texts noted above, however, use the 
expression in absolute form, allowing them to function as a background to the 
absolute sayings in John. A cluster of texts in Isaiah18 also use the expression in its 
predicated form and hence the blend of predicated and absolute forms encountered in 
the gospel is paralleled quite broadly in the prophet. All of this points to these א אוה ינ
sayings as constituting the principal, or immediate, background to the ἐγώ εἰμι 
sayings of John.   
The texts in Deuteronomy and Isaiah use the expression in connection with the 
uniqueness of God’s identity.19 The first two texts can be read fairly straightforwardly 
in order to highlight this, with the key points set in italics: 
 
Deut 32:39 See now that I, even I, am he; there is no god beside me. (ἴδετε  
ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν θεὸς πλὴν ἐμοῦ ) 
    I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal; 
    and no one can deliver from my hand.   
 
Isaiah 43:10 You are my witnesses, says the LORD, 
                                                 
17 Isaiah 43:10, 25; 45:8, 18–19, 22; 46:4, 9; 51:12; 52:6. Occasionally, as in 43:25, 
the form אוה יכנא is encountered. Interestingly, in 43:25, the 1st person pronoun is 
doubled, reflected in a doubled ἐγώ εἰμι in the Greek translation.  
18 For example, Is. 48:12, 17; 56:3. 
19  This highlights a problem in the argument of M. David Litwa, We Are Being 
Transformed: Deification in Paul’s Soteriology (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012). Litwa 
consistently approaches the concept of deity as something associated with attributes 
such as eternity, and is scornful of the weight placed by biblical scholarship on the 
articulations of monotheism in “Second Isaiah” (see, esp, 230). Litwa’s work suffers 
from the same error that Bauckham pinpoints in his essay God Crucified (Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 1998): he fails to see that the identity question—“Who is God?”—is 
more basic to the texts than the ontological one (“What is deity/divinity?”). Litwa is 
consistently blind to the significance of the divine name as a label of identity, not just 
in Isaiah, but in the Old Testament and Second Temple texts broadly.     
    and my servant whom I have chosen, 
    so that you may know and believe me 
    and understand that I am he (καὶ συνῆτε ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι ). 
    Before me no god was formed, 
    nor shall there be any after me.   
 
Isaiah 46:4-5 requires a little more comment as the Greek departs from the Hebrew by 
adding an additional ἐγώ εἰμι clause, which I have highlighted in bold below:  
 
Hebrew (MT):  
 
טלמאו לבסא ינאו אשא ינאו יתישע ינא לבסא ינא הביש דעו אוה ינא הנקז דעו 
המדנו ינולשמתו וושתו ינוימדת ימל 
 
Even to your old age I am he; even when you turn gray I will carry you. 
I have made, and I will bear; I will carry and will save. 





4 ἕως γήρους ἐγώ εἰμι, καὶ ἕως ἂν καταγηράσητε, ἐγώ εἰμι· ἐγὼ ἀνέχομαι ὑμῶν, 
ἐγὼ ἐποίησα καὶ ἐγὼ ἀνήσω, ἐγὼ ἀναλήμψομαι καὶ σώσω ὑμᾶς.  5 τίνι με 
ὡμοιώσατε; ἴδετε τεχνάσασθε, οἱ πλανώμενοι. 
 
4 Even to old age I am (he); and until you have grown old, I am (he): I lift/carry 
you, I have made, and I will relieve, I will take up and save you.  5 To whom have 
you compared me? See, consider, you that go astray. 
  
The addition of the second ἐγώ εἰμι is interesting, for it suggests that the Greek phrase 
had become established as a designation of the divine identity of the speaker, 
paralleling the significance of the Hebrew אוה ינא that it generally translates, and could 
now enjoy a certain independence. As with the other such sayings, ἐγώ εἰμι in Isaiah 
46:4–5 is linked to an emphasis on divine uniqueness:  “To whom have you compared 
me? See, consider, you that go astray.” 
 In both Isaiah 43:10 and 46:4, the dual temporal dimension of pre-existence and 
eschatological ultimacy is an important part of God’s uniqueness. He existed before 
any other god and promises his presence into his servant’s old age because of his own 
imperviousness to the ravages of time. This is further reflected in 48:12, where the 
ἐγώ εἰμι form is encountered in combination with another phrase that has already 
separately been used in 44:6, ‘the first and the last’, serving as an expression of self-
identity by the LORD, the King of Israel. 20  
                                                 
20 Isaiah 44:6 reads “I am the first and I am the last; besides me there is no god. 7 Who 
is like me?” Interestingly, the preceding verse (44:5) plays on the idea of names:  
 
 12 I am He; I am the first, and I am the last (ןורחא ינא ףא ןושאר ינא אוה ינא; ἐγώ εἰμι 
πρῶτος, καὶ ἐγώ εἰμι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα)13 My hand laid the foundation of the earth, 
and my right hand spread out the heavens. 
 
The phrase thus points to the unique eternality and sovereignty of God, and this has 
been highlighted by scholarly examination of the sayings. Catrin Williams, whose 
study remains the most detailed and important analysis of the אוה ינא sayings and their 
interpretation, concludes that the expression, “serves as a declaration of the unique 
sovereignty of Yahweh” and marks his unique status as the “eternally active God … 
the Creator of all things.”21 This is surely correct, but it needs to be balanced by a 
proper recognition that the principal concern of the texts is with divine identity; the 
status implications are derived from this. Williams’s work, which is here broadly in 
line with other scholarship on the sayings, reflects the same shift that we noted in 
Schleiermacher and Tillich.    
Demonstrative of this concern with identity, it is significant that most of the ἐγώ 
εἰμι statements in Isaiah are closely associated with occurrences of the divine name. It 
is “the LORD” who so speaks and designates himself in this way, and the connection 
with the name is sometimes elaborated in the wider context. Isaiah 43:10, for 
example, is followed in 43:11 by “I am the LORD” (הוהי יכנא יכנא; ἐγὼ ὁ θεός),22 a 
phrase echoed in the ἐγώ εἰμι saying of 43:25, with its doubled 1st person pronoun (“I, 
I am he who blots out your transgressions”). In 45:8 the ἐγώ εἰμι elaborates the 
pronoun in ויתארב הוהי ינא , “I, the LORD, have created it,” transforming it to “I am 
(ἐγώ εἰμι) the LORD who creates it.” 48:12 lacks the name, but in 48:17, just a few 
verses further on, it is explicitly “the LORD” who says “I am your God.”23 Similar 
observations can be made with most of the occurrences. So, the formula comes to 
have a particular association with the divine name. 
This alone would be significant for the interpretation of the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings in 
John: the expression evokes the divine name by association, even if it does not itself 
represent the name. It is, though, all the more striking when we note that the language 
and imagery used in these sayings has a measure of overlap with later Jewish 
treatments of the divine name. In Targum Pseudo Jonathan, for example, we 
encounter a modestly elaborated version of the disclosure of the name in Ex 3:14 (“I 
am what I am and I will be what I will be”24) and a more significantly elaborated 
version of the “I am he” statement of Deut 32:39: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
This one will say, “I am the LORD’S,” another will be called by the name of 
Jacob, yet another will write on the hand, “The LORD’S,” and adopt the 
name of Israel. 
21 Williams, I am He, 304. 
22  Interestingly, the Greek does not here render the doubling of the first person 
pronoun with ἐγώ εἰμι.  
23 What the LORD says here changes in the translation to Greek. “I am the LORD 
your God” becomes simply “I am your God.” 
24  3:14b: adds אניוהד. 3:14a: “He who said and the world was, (who) said and 
everything was.” See the excellent discussion in Robert J. Wilkinson, 
Tetragrammaton: Western Christians and the Hebrew Name of God. From the 
Beginnings to the Seventeenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 182–3.  
Behold now, that I am he who am, and was, and will be, and there is no other God 
beside me: I, in my Word, kill and make alive;   
 
 אוה אנא יחמו תיממ ירמימב אנא ינימ־רב ןרוח אקלא תילו יוהמל דיתעד אוה אנאו תיוהו ייווהד
לארשׂי תיב אמע תי יתיחמ 
 
The elaboration of the “I am he” statement in this verse is particularly interesting 
because it appears to reflect a deliberate interpretation of the saying in the light of 
Exodus 3:14.  
Those familiar with the book of Revelation will immediately notice the parallels 
of this elaboration with the divine epithets used in that book; it is important to 
recognize the extent to which these provide evidence that what is found in the targum 
is a tradition of divine-name reflection that can be traced back into Second Temple 
Judaism. The parallels between Revelation and the Targum Pseudo Jonathan are 
constituted by a pattern of “Alpha and Omega”/“First and Last” sayings that run 
through the book, within which both God and Jesus are identified as the speakers: 
 
Rev. 1:8   “I am the Alpha and the Omega,” says the Lord God, who is and who 
was and who is to come, the Almighty. (God) 
 
Rev. 1:17-18   When I saw him, I fell at his feet as though dead. But he placed his 
right hand on me, saying, “Do not be afraid; I am the first and the last, and the 
living one. I was dead, and see, I am alive forever and ever; and I have the keys of 
Death and of Hades. (Jesus) 
 
Rev. 2:8   “And to the angel of the church in Smyrna write: These are the words of 
the first and the last, who was dead and came to life (Jesus) 
 
Rev. 21:6 Then he said to me, “It is done! I am the Alpha and the Omega, the 
beginning and the end. To the thirsty I will give water as a gift from the spring of 
the water of life. (God) 
 
Rev. 22:13 I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and 
the end.” (Jesus) 
   
In the case of Revelation 1:8 and 1:17, these sayings are also introduced with the ἐγώ 
εἰμι formula, though in predicated form. The first is nearly identical to Targum 
Pseudo-Jonathan Deut 32:39; the second parallels Isaiah 44:6/48:12.  
The extent to which this embodies reflection on the divine name emerges from 
closer examination of the pattern. The use of “Alpha” and “Omega” as parallels for 
“first and last” reflects the location of these letters in the Greek alphabet. But they are 
also the vowels used in the word Adonai, used in place of the divine name when 
Scripture was read, the vowels of which would later be super-imposed on the 
Tetragrammaton in the MT. What this suggests is an inner-biblical25 co-ordination of 
                                                 
25  This terminology is associated with a movement in biblical scholarship that 
analyzes the way that Scriptures are read, interpreted and reworked within the biblical 
texts themselves in ways that reflect the principles of interpretation articulated in the 
Rabbinic middot. Most of the relevant scholarship has been developed in the study of 
the Hebrew Bible and Second Temple texts. The approach was pioneered by Michael 
the Tetragrammaton itself with the אוה ינא/ ἐγώ εἰμι saying of Isaiah 48:12 (paralleled 
by 44:6). At this stage in the argument the key observation is simply that Revelation 
provides supporting evidence that what we encounter in the text of Targum Pseudo 
Jonathan reflects traditional and probably widespread ways of reflecting on the 
association of the Tetragrammaton and the verb “to be” (and the specific forms 
encountered in Exodus 3:14), and that these appear to have been coordinated with the 
אוה ינא/ ἐγώ εἰμι sayings of Deutero-Isaiah.  
The point is an important one, for it serves to balance the observations made by 
Williams concerning the limited overlap of the interpretation of Exodus 3:14 with the 
Isaianic אוה ינא sayings. Williams rightly highlights the extent to which there is a 
distinctive pattern of development for each through their translations and 
interpretations, directed towards particular strategies for asserting monotheism. This 
becomes important to her eventual conclusion that the אוה ינא sayings have their own 
“distinctive character and theological import” that is not identical to the 
Tetragrammaton, and that the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings in John “convey the message that 
God’s saving powers are made visible and accessible in Jesus.”26  Williams’ work is 
careful and undoubtedly correct, but the evidence of Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and 
Revelation also confirms that these two distinct traditions within Judaism were 
coordinated and that this was exploited for Christological purposes within early 
Christian theology. 
One further observation on the targumic material can now be made. The “I am he” 
sayings occur in close proximity to significant uses of the word Memra (רמימ, 
“Word”), often connected to the related works of creation and providence. This can be 
seen in the translation of Deuteronomy 32:39 above: “I, in my Word, kill and make 
alive.” More notable examples of this can be found in the targumic translations of 
Isaiah 45:12 and 48:13, in each of which it is “by my Memra” (ירמימב) that God 
stretches out the heavens and creates the earth.  The possibility that the Memra of the 
targums provides some background to the use of Logos in John 1 has received fresh 
attention of late, in studies by John Ronning and Daniel Boyarin among others.27 In 
Ronning’s case, Memra is understood as a straight circumlocution for God; in 
Boyarin’s, the use of the word as a substitute for the divine name becomes the basis 
for a developing Jewish binitarianism, in which the Memra is seen to have distinct 
identity and existence. The observation I make here is quite specific and doesn’t rely 
                                                                                                                                            
A. Fishbane, “Revelation and Tradition: Aspects of Inner-Biblical Exegesis,” Journal 
of Biblical Literature, 99 (1980), 343-61. George Brooke’s research on the use of 
Scripture at Qumran has highlighted the extent to which the Rabbinic codes reflect 
earlier (i.e., Second Temple) practices. See his Exegesis at Qumran: 4QFlorilegium in 
its Jewish Context (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985). One of the best entry points into the 
methodology and its published literature is found in the introduction of William A. 
Tooman, Gog of Magog: Reuse of Scripture and Compositional Technique in Ezekiel 
38-39 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). The approach has not yet had as significant 
an impact on New Testament research as it should have; the work of Susan E. 
Docherty, The Use of the Old Testament in Hebrews: A Case Study in Early Jewish 
Interpretation (WUNT II:260. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009) is a notable exception 
that draws seriously on the relevant scholarship.    
26 Williams, I am He, 303.  
27 John Ronning, Jewish Targums and John’s Logos Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2010); Daniel Boyarin, “The Gospel of the Memra: Jewish Binitarianism and the 
Prologue to John” Harvard Theological Review 94 (2001), 243–84. 
on the validity of Ronning’s or Boyarin’s arguments as a whole: it is simply that the 
word Memra occurs in close proximity to the Isaianic ἐγώ εἰμι/ אוה ינא sayings in 
which God is represented as eternal, and its association with creation is connected to 
this representation of God’s pre-existence. This is suggestive, at least, of the particular 
combination of devices (Logos and I Am sayings) that we encounter in John.   
Several specifically theological points may now be isolated from the discussion 
above.  First, while the disclosure of the divine name in Exodus 3:14 and the 
Deuteronomic/Isaianic אוה ינא/ ἐγώ εἰμι sayings have distinct significance that should 
not be collapsed, they are coordinated in the traditions, in such a way that the 
significance of each becomes identified with the other. This is particularly important 
in relation to the most basic assertions of divine identity: the one who is named by the 
Tetragrammaton is the same one who proclaims himself unique in the אוה ינא/ ἐγώ εἰμι 
sayings.  
Second, the coordination of the traditions means that the divine name is associated 
with the temporal priority and ultimacy of the one identified in the אוה ינא/ ἐγώ εἰμι 
sayings. This is not simply a matter of asserting the eternity of God, but of asserting 
this to be uniquely a predicate of God, one that defines his relationship to all that is 
outside of himself. All of his relations ad extra are relations between one who is 
eternal and that which is temporal. By asserting that God is uniquely First and Last, 
this is affirmed in a way that connects it to his very name: היהא רשא היהא. What must 
not be overlooked is that this disclosure of identity is also an act of personal 
communication: YHWH gives his name, even as he gives himself. 
Third, this move ultimately requires the use of the term aseity to designate the 
character of God’s relationship to the temporal cosmos, not merely in its temporality, 
but in its entirety. The priority and ultimacy of God mean that his existence must be 
considered independently of the creaturely cosmos; it is not contingent upon the 
cosmos. God is a se, in a way that must therefore be considered unique. The cosmos 
is contingent upon his reality, as Creator and Provider, and his reality is not dependent 
upon its. But precisely because of the character of his aseity, that is an underived 
fullness that may be described as ‘good’, the temporal cosmos is: God, in his self-
subsistence and fullness has chosen to share himself creatively.           
All of this is intended to stress that the reader who approaches the Fourth Gospel 
through its invoked textual backgrounds brings to the text a particular identification of 
the God of Israel, one that is associated with a divine name that speaks of a particular 
relationship to the created temporal cosmos, which is in turn the basis for the 
monotheistic claim. To set such language on the lips of Jesus is not just to radically 
identify the man with God, but to shockingly identify God with the man.  
 
3. The Prologue of John’s Gospel: The Recasting of Divine Identity and 
the Re-placing of the Divine Name 
 
 
The prologue to the Gospel is the necessary entry point into the wider book and it 
prepares its reader to expect that their way of thinking about God will be altered by 
the disclosure that has taken place in the incarnation: Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε· 
μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο (1:18). John is a 
highly structured and complex text, in which various literary devices are deployed in 
service of the theology of the writer(s). Assumptions or conclusions concerning the 
redactional history of the text play some part in how we understand these devices to 
interact, but even approaches that operate with a more complicated account of the 
development of the text acknowledge the theological continuity of the various stages 
of authorship, allowing us to consider the final form of the text without having to 
make too many assumptions about how this relates to its prior stages.28 The prologue 
to the Gospel (1:1-18) is sometimes considered to represent a late addition to the text, 
but the lexical and thematic connections with the wider gospel text are striking; the 
sensitive reader will find that this section of text anticipates what is to follow, and 
what follows will often appear to echo the prologue.29 
 The prologue, of course, establishes a strong identification of Jesus with God, one 
that we shall see to be closely linked to the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings. Most obviously, this is 
done through the opening declaration, ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word 
was with God and the Word was God (καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος)’. A great deal, of course, 
has been written on the significance of the term λόγος and its possible backgrounds.30 
While there is little need to rehearse the details of those discussions here, a key point 
must be noted. Although scholars have often sought to isolate a single background or 
parallel as the key influence—Wisdom, Torah, Memra or Philo’s appropriation of 
Stoic terminology—there is a growing recognition in studies of the Hebrew Bible and 
early Judaism that the imagery in question develops in an associative and not a 
competitive way, and this must be factored into the evaluation of the imagery here.31 
That is to say, the use of λόγος may deliberately invoke a complex of texts and 
traditions involving Wisdom and Torah and attempts to narrow this to one element of 
this complex, perhaps associated with a particular school, are misguided. In light of 
what we saw in the previous section about the close association between the Memra 
and the divine name in the targums, this associative dimension is suggestive; it leads 
us to expect some occurrence of the divine name in the near context.32  
                                                 
28 The preoccupation with source-criticism has generated a massive literature on the 
Fourth Gospel, especially in relation to the Prologue, which has often been seen as an 
adaptation of an earlier hymn. For relevant bibliography, see Craig S. Keener, The 
Gospel of John (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 105–15, 333–37. An excellent, if now 
dated, list is also found in Ed L. Miller, Salvation History in the Prologue of John: 
The Significance of John 11:3/4 (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 2, ftnote 3. More recently, 
Boyarin, “The Gospel of the Memra,” 262–68, lists (and engages with) the key works. 
In addition to the works listed above, see also Peter J. Williams, “Not the Prologue of 
John,” JSNT 33 (2011) 375–386. 
29  See Martin Hengel, “The Prologue of the Gospel of John as the Gateway to 
Christological Truth,” in Richard Bauckham and Carl Mosser, eds, The Gospel of 
John and Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 265–94; Richard 
Bauckham, The Testimony of the Beloved Disciple (Grand Rapids: Baker), 271–83. 
30 Any good commentary will provide details of the literature; Boyarin, “Gospel of the 
Memra” and Ronning, Jewish Targums also list the relevant works. 
31See the articles by Michael V. Fox and Stuart Weeks in Mark R. Sneed, ed., Was 
There a Wisdom Tradition? New Prospects in Israelite Wisdom Studies (Atlanta: SBL 
Press, 2015): Fox, “Three Theses on Wisdom,” 69–86; Weeks, “Wisdom, Form, and 
Genre,” 161–178. 
32 When set within this observation, the recent renewal of interest in the theory that 
the Memra (Word) of the Aramaic targums provides a distinctive parallel to the λόγος 
takes on fresh significance, for as we have seen, the Memra is closely associated with 
 Given what we saw in our discussion of aseity, it is significant that the Word is 
identified in both temporal and relational terms: he was with God (πρὸς τὸν θεόν) in 
the beginning. Only once this prior relationship has been described does the Prologue 
recount the creational role of the Logos (1:3–4). The link to John the Baptist’s 
testimony should not be overlooked: 
 
John testified to him and cried out, “This was he of whom I said,  
‘He who comes after me (ὁ ὀπίσω μου ἐρχόμενος) 
ranks ahead of me (ἔμπροσθέν μου γέγονεν) 
because he was before me (ὅτι πρῶτός μου ἦν).’”  (1:15)    
 
This is reminiscent of the versions of John’s words that are encountered in the 
Synoptics, but here the theme of status is tied quite specifically to temporal priority: 
Jesus was “before” John and this is the grounds for his superior status. It is difficult 
not to hear an anticipation of John 8:58 (“Before Abraham was, I am”) in these words 
and, as with that text, this one combines the temporal elements in a quite striking way.  
 It is important that this is recognized when the parallels between the representation 
of the Logos and that of Wisdom, Torah or Memra are discussed.33 We must be 
sensitive to the fact that here they are used to differentiate the status and identity of 
individual human beings, of two cousins whose identities and significance could, if 
viewed without such perspective, be seen as nothing more than accidents of history. 
As readers, we are made aware that the one of whom we read is Jesus of Nazareth, the 
cousin of John the Baptist, who had been crucified outside Jerusalem under Pontius 
Pilate. There is, in other words, a historical and personal particularity now identified 
as the one who “was πρῶτός” and this identification sets him in a category apart, at 
once from other contemporary individuals held to be important (such as John), and 
from other figures associated with the divine work of creation (such as Wisdom or 
Torah). This personal dimension is only fully appreciated when we consider the 
revelatory significance attached to the Logos. The Word that is identified with the 
otherwise unseen God is the one who makes him known (1:18) and this personal 
individuation will come to be specifically defined in the representation of Jesus of 
                                                                                                                                            
the divine name, particularly in relation to creation. Jarl Fossum, The Image of the 
Invisible God: Essays on the Influence of Jewish Mysticism on Early Christology 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1995) notes that the same tendency to personify 
that is seen in relation to Wisdom and Memra is seen in relation to the Name in 
Second Temple texts such as Jubilees: 
 
… the glorious and honoured and great and splendid and amazing and mighty 
Name which created heaven and earth and everything together (Jub 36:7). 
 
Recognizing that such imagery functions associatively rather than competitively 
allows us to see name traditions as invoked alongside the other backgrounds to the 
Prologue. This has implications for how we understand the coherence of the Prologue 
with the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings: both, potentially, are part of a coherent strategy to represent 
Jesus by allusion to a complex of traditions about the agency of God in creation. That 
is, he is identified with the thing that most particularly renders the unique identity of 
the creating God: his name. 
33 For the detail, see Boyarin, “The Gospel of the Memra.” 
Nazareth.34 The parallels with Wisdom, Torah or Memra reach the limits of their 
potential significance when “the Word becomes flesh.” 
 Unsurprisingly, given what we have noted about the associative deployment of the 
Memra, the prologue also provides us with the first use of the word ὄνομα in John’s 
Gospel. In 1:12, we read: 
 
But to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become 
children of God. 
 
ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς 
πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ 
 
The significance of this reference to those who “believed in his name” should not be 
underestimated. As the most basic level, it points to an acknowledgement of the 
identity of Jesus, but the combination of concepts is one that draws upon traditional 
affirmations of trusting in the One God: 
 
Our heart is glad in him, because we trust in his holy name. (Psa. 33:21) 
 
Who among you fears the LORD and obeys the voice of his servant, 
who walks in darkness and has no light, 
yet trusts in the name of the LORD and relies upon his God? (Is. 50:10) 
 
The latter passage, in particular, provides a suggestive background to John 1:12, given 
the range of lexical overlaps (darkness, light, name).  
 John 1:12 is, in fact, the first of 25 occurrences of “name” in John. The 
distribution and referential significance of these is interesting. As Joshua Coutts has 
recently noted in his dissertation on the topic: “Of the twenty-five uses of ὄνομα in 
GJohn, twelve refer to Jesus’ name, and eight to the Father’s Name (divine Name) 
(5.43; 10.25; 12.13; 12.28; 17.6, 11-12, 26).”35 Of the occurrences of the word in 
relation to the name of Jesus, another two (2:23, 3:18) present it as the object of the 
verb πιστεύω, developing the association that we have seen to be at work in 1:12. The 
name of Jesus is represented as the object of faith in the same way that the name of 
YHWH is in the Old Testament. Later chapters of the gospel give the name of Jesus 
particular significance in relation to the practices of prayer: requests made “in my 
name” (14:13,14; 15:16; 16:23, 24, 26) will answered by God. The name here has a 
certain mediatorial significance that is effectively inverted in the references to the 
Spirit being sent in the name of Jesus (14:26): 
 
But the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will 
teach you everything, and remind you of all that I have said to you.   
                                                 
34  Boyarin, “Gospel of the Memra,” deals sensitively with the personification of 
Wisdom in the Jewish traditions and the backgrounds these provide to the imagery of 
personal presence in John 1:14. I cannot see any parallels, though, to the human 
particularity of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel. Personification is one thing; particular 
humanity is another.  
35 Joshua Coutts, “‘My Father’s Name’: The Significance and Impetus of the Divine 
Name in the Fourth Gospel,’ (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2016), 1.  
 A complex association, then, is established between the name of Jesus and the name 
of God: on one hand, the name of Jesus is treated in terms that correspond to trusting 
in the name of YHWH, while on the other hand, it plays a distinctive mediatorial 
function in the human act of prayer and in the divine act of sending. All of this 
reaches a climax in John 17, with two paired statements that Jesus has made the name 
of God known to his disciples, between which is encountered another two paired 
references to the name being given to him: 
 
I have made your name known to those whom you gave me from the world. They 
were yours, and you gave them to me, and they have kept your word. John 17:6.    
 
And now I am no longer in the world, but they are in the world, and I am coming 
to you. Holy Father, protect them in your name that you have given me, so that 
they may be one, as we are one. While I was with them, I protected them in your 
name that you have given me. I guarded them, and not one of them was lost 
except the one destined to be lost, so that the scripture might be fulfilled. John 
17:11–12. 
 
I made your name known to them, and I will make it known, so that the love with 
which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them. John 17:26. 
 
These occurrences of the word ὄνομα constitute the final cluster in which the word is 
used of either Jesus or God and it is not inappropriate to see them as drawing to a 
climax the elements that have been developed through the gospel to this point. It is 
worth noting the apocalyptic or revelatory quality in 17:6 and 17:26. It is also worth 
noting the likely allusion to Isaiah 52:6 that these verses constitute:   
 
 
Is. 52:6 Therefore my people shall know my name; therefore in that day they shall 
know that it is I who speak; here am I. 
 
Is. 52:6   יננה רבדמה אוה ינא יכ אוהה םויב ןכל ימש ימע עדי ןכל  
 
Is. 52:6 διὰ τοῦτο γνώσεται ὁ λαός μου τὸ ὄνομά μου ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ, ὅτι ἐγώ 
εἰμι αὐτὸς ὁ λαλῶν· πάρειμι 
 
 
The pattern of references to the name of Jesus and the name of God reaches its climax 
with an allusion to one of the passages in which we encounter a predicated אוה ינא 
statement, and this is, at the very least, suggestive of the connection between the name 
christology of the gospel and the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings.  
This grounds all discussion of Johannine soteriology. The soteriological account 
that is subsequently unpacked in the gospel, in which people are saved by the one who 
explicates himself by the “I am” sayings, is traced back not merely to creation and 
fall, but to the perfection of the divine fullness in its inner relations. As well as 
recasting its details in general, this draws fresh attention to its trajectory, which is 
towards the involvement of its beneficiaries in those relations: when Jesus indicates 
that he has come that his people might have “life to the full” (John 10:10), he points 
forward to the life that is subsequently defined as knowing God and sharing in the 
fellowship that is internal to the Trinity (17:3, 21–23). The density of “name” 
language in this latter passage should not be overlooked: the participation in view is 
one of personal communion. 
 
4. The “I Am” Sayings in John  
 
Having surveyed these key backgrounds and contexts, we now finally turn to the ἐγώ 
εἰμι sayings in John. My intention here is not to look at each of these in detail, but 
rather to isolate some of the ways in which specific sayings draw upon the themes we 
have just noted in the background texts and contexts. These allow us to see ways by 
which the sayings—considered as a set—may render the identity of Jesus with respect 
to God and the temporal cosmos.   
There are twenty-four occurrences of ἐγώ εἰμι in John’s gospel.  Within these, we 
normally identify seven predicated sayings,36 counting the duplicated sayings as one 
(notably, “I am the bread of life,” which occurs in three variant forms).37 This allows 
us to relate the seven sayings to other literary devices in the text that use a sevenfold 
pattern, particularly the signs. In truth, there are two further non-absolute sayings in 
8:23 that may added to this list: “I am from above” and “I am not of this world.” 
These, however, are formally distinct from the other sayings in that the ἐγώ and the 
εἰμι are separated:  
 
ἐγὼ ἐκ τῶν ἄνω εἰμί· 
ἐγὼ οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου.   
 
Despite this formal distinction, the two sayings in 8:23 provide a helpful entry point 
into considering the predicated statements because they stress the pre-existence of 
Jesus; more precisely, they emphasize that the speaker enjoyed a heavenly existence 
prior to and independent of his earthly one. In the terms that we noted in our 
discussion of the Prologue, the incarnation is represented as involving a movement, 
from outside the cosmos and outside time to inside these realities. His existence, in 
other words, is not contingent upon earthly matter or upon his emergence within the 
flow of time. The latter is, instead, contingent upon the former.  
This same logic emerges in the first and most extensively developed of the 
predicated sayings, that concerning Jesus as the bread of life: “I am the (living) bread 
that came down from heaven” (6:41,51). In this context, too, we have an explanation 
for the movement:  
                                                 
36 “I am the bread of life,” 6:35, 41, 48, 51; “I am the light of the world,” 8:12; “I am 
the door of the sheep,” 10:7, 9; “I am the good shepherd,” 10:11, 14; “I am the 
resurrection and the life,” 11:25; “I am the way, and the truth, and the life,” 14:6; “I 
am the true vine,” 15:1, 5. 
37 John 6:33: For the bread of God is that which comes down from heaven and gives 
life to the world. John 6:35: Jesus said to them, “I am the bread of life. Whoever 
comes to me will never be hungry, and whoever believes in me will never be thirsty” 
(cf also John 6:48, I am the bread of life). John 6:51, “I am the living bread that 
came down from heaven. Whoever eats of this bread will live forever; and the bread 
that I will give for the life of the world is my flesh.” 
 I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him who 
sent me (6:38) 
 
While this could be read in subordinationist terms, it is more valuable to recognize 
that it grounds the descent, the involvement with creation, in the Son’s loving service 
of the Father. The incarnation is an outreaching of the love that is internal to the life 
of God. This grounds the exclusivity of the identification that is replicated in all of the 
predicated ἐγώ εἰμι sayings: he, and no other, is predicated as the source of life. This 
series of exclusive identifications specifically begins with one in which the pre-
temporal relationship with the Father is stressed, and not just pre-existence.  
 The temporal significance of the bread of life saying is not confined to pre-
existence. More subtly, as John deploys the saying, he also uses temporal language to 
indicate the permanent and inexhaustible character of the life that he, as the bread of 
life, is able to provide. His capacity to provide sustenance and satisfaction is not 
eroded or consumed over time and is, therefore, represented as something that is not 
contingent on the frailties of his creaturely existence. Rather, it participates in the 
perfect, eternal fullness of God:  
 
The one who comes to me shall not hunger, the one who believes in me shall 
never thirst (6:35).  
 
The last clause echoes the promise of living water that was made to the Samaritan 
woman in John 4:10,13 and 14. The use of the cognate verbal and nominal forms ζῶν 
and ζωή, applied both to the bread and the water, binds the images further. What is 
important to note is that both passages represent the life that is found in Jesus as not 
subject to the normal declines or fluctuations of time. Importantly, the fact that this is 
designated by the expression ἐγώ εἰμι means that this property of the life that Jesus 
shares with others is understood to be a function of his own being, rather than simply 
a property that he mediates from another source (i.e., from a God considered other). 
He was, is, and will be the source of sustenance and satiety.  
The same emphasis arises in the second of the sayings, “I am the light of the 
world” (8:12, 9:5). Once again, Jesus negates any suggestion of limitation or 
deterioration in his capacity to share light:  
 
I am the light of the world. Whoever follows me will never walk (οὐ μὴ 
περιπατήσῃ) in darkness but will have the light of life. 
 
The linking of light and life takes us back to both the Prologue and to John 5:26: 
 
In him was life, and the life was the light of all men.   
 (ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· John 1:4) 
 
For just as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life 
in himself (τῷ υἱῷ ἔδωκεν ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. John 5:26) 
 
These are some of the key texts that have grounded the theological traditions around 
the aseity of the Son. It is important not to allow discussions of potential 
subordination within the Godhead (i.e., that grapple with what is signified by the 
Father’s “giving to have life”) to obscure the key detail that the Son’s life is “in 
himself” (ἐν ἑαυτῷ).38 The same point obtains here as did in regard to the first of the 
sayings: the Son does not mediate a life that is derived from another source, but is 
himself the light of the world. All of these themes converge in John 14:6—“I am the 
way, the truth and the life”—and in the final saying of 15:1 and 15:5—“I am the vine 
… apart from me you can do nothing.”  
This positive claim to be the one who shares a life that is a se is wrapped up, in the 
Fourth Gospel with the concept of resurrection. In the immediate context of John 
5:26, the Gospel speaks of the dead hearing the voice of the Son of Man and coming 
forth from their graves (5:25, 28–9), an image that is enacted in the story of Lazarus, 
where we encounter another of the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings:   
 
I am the resurrection and the life. Those who believe in me, even though they die, 
will live, and everyone who lives and believes in me will never die. (John 11:25) 
 
Again, by depicting resurrection not just as something Jesus gives or mediates from a 
separate source, but as something he is, the text demands that the resurrection of 
Lazarus is understood to be a participation in Jesus’ own resurrection; like Jesus, he 
will live even though he dies. For the attentive reader of the Gospel, this invites 
reflection on the previous ἐγώ εἰμι saying: 
 
I am the Good Shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep 
(10:11, cf. 10:14–15). 
 
No one takes [my life] from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have power 
to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again (10:18). 
 
Having detected the significance of aseity in the language of the other ἐγώ εἰμι 
sayings, we can see more clearly that the text grounds hope in the resurrection in the 
self-subsistent life of God. The cross is fundamentally contextualised by how its 
reality relates to the reality of the one being crucified: if the sheep are to be saved, the 
Shepherd must lay down his life, but he can do so redemptively because he has in 
himself the authority to take it up again. His death is not the terminal point of his 
narrative, and precisely because of this it opens the hope of resurrection, of a story 
that continues beyond termination, to those who will hear his voice and will abide in 
his life. The key soteriological move in the gospel is that the Son willingly 
accommodates himself to the strictures of time and space in his act of enfleshment. 
He is not impervious to the effects of these while incarnate, but, as the one whose life 
is inherent to his own being (and thus not contingent upon the fate of the flesh that he 
assumes or becomes), he is able to lay down that life and to take it up again.  
There are subtle points of language to which we must be attentive. Bauckham, 
drawing on Moltmann, is surely in line with Johannine thought when he sees the 
redemptive significance of the cross as a function of its inalienable connection to the 
                                                 
38  For this point, and its significance to theological readings such as those of 
Augustine, see Webster, “Life in and of Himself,” 25. Webster’s argument is 
developed in Ellis, Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism and the Aseity of the Son, 197–
226. The link between John 5:26 and the “I am” sayings that I trace here might be 
taken as a support of the particularly strong account of the Son’s aseity that Webster 
and Ellis, drawing on Calvin, develop. 
resurrection, itself a function of its incorporation into the narrative of the trinitarian 
life: 
 
The resurrection is God’s promise of liberation from suffering for all those with 
whom Christ is identified in his cross, the godless and the godforsaken. In the 
cross all human suffering is taken within God's own “trinitarian history” in hope 
for the joy of God's eschatological future.39  
 
For John, though, this functional reality proceeds from the most basic ontological 
reality of divine aseity and this demands that any use of the language of “history” is 
carefully qualified. Arguably Jüngel’s way of framing the redemptive union of the 
contingent and the non-contingent, in terms of the divine being “als Auch-sich-
heraus-Gehen in das Nichts”40 is closer to what we see in John’s Gospel, here and 
elsewhere. 41  To speak without such qualifications of the cross becoming part of 
trinitarian history runs the risk of describing only the functional realities that are 
visible from within the created order. But those realities are grounded in the ontology 
of the incarnation itself, by which the one who is God of himself, of himself gave 
himself. 




The Fourth Gospel introduces Jesus as the one who will make God known (1:18), and 
biblical scholarship must be attentive to the properly theological significance of this; 
according to the Gospel, talk of God, in himself, must be informed by the reality of 
the incarnation. The representation of Jesus in the Gospel draws upon a stock of 
coordinated traditions associated with the divine identity and attributes, particularly 
the divine name and the ἐγώ εἰμι/אוה ינא sayings. Within the biblical and Jewish 
literature, these distinct traditions are interwoven around the concept of divine aseity, 
                                                 
39  Richard Bauckham, “Only the Suffering God Can Help: Divine Passibility in 
Modern Theology,” Themelios 9 (1984), 12, drawing on Jürgen Moltmann, The 
Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian 
Theology (London: SCM, 1974), 278. 
40 Gott als Geheimnis, 303. 
41 A similar play on the temporal significance of the divine name seems to be at work 
in some of the non-predicated ἐγώ εἰμι sayings. There are nine such absolute sayings, 
in which Jesus uses the words ἐγὼ εἰμί without a predicated image. Taking these 
together with the 7 predicated saying, some of which are repeated several times, gives 
us the figure of 24, noted earlier. In most cases, the non-predicated sayings tend to be 
translated (quite defensibly) as “I am he.” In terms of this article, the most obviously 
relevant of these sayings is that of John 8:58: “Before Abraham was, I am” (πρὶν 
Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι ἐγὼ εἰμί). This appears to be a clear ascription of pre-existence to 
Jesus and one that triggers an attempt to stone him for blasphemy. This cannot simply 
be a matter of the claim to pre-existence, since this might be made without claiming to 
be God; rather, the blasphemy is constituted by the way in which that claim is made, 
that is, by appropriating the divine self-designation ἐγώ εἰμι.  
which is not reducible to the notions of eternity or non-contingency, but is a more 
positive concept that labels divine self-subsistence: ‘God is from himself, and from 
himself God gives himself’.42      
The Gospel, from its opening line, represents the Son as participating in the inner 
relations of God and, as a consequence of this, in God’s unique relationship to time: 
he is not simply (in our terms) pre-existent, but is πρῶτός, being with God ἐν ἀρχῇ. 
The origins and the ends of the cosmos derive their life from the underived fullness of 
God, now understood in incipiently trinitarian terms, and the arc of Johannine 
soteriology must be plotted in terms of such reference points: the one who has life in 
himself has come that others might share that life, by sharing in the eternal fellowship 
of the Godhead (17: 3, 21–23). In its representation of incarnation, the Gospel applies 
spatial language with what must therefore be seen to have both temporal and 
relational implications: ‘the Word became flesh and dwelt among us’ designates a 
new condition in which the God who is outside time enters it in such a way to make 
temporal and geographical locatedness part of his own identity, with salvific purpose.  
Crucially, the Gospel proceeds to coordinate the name of the one who is so 
temporally and geographically located with the name of God himself: the name of 
Jesus and the name of YHWH are now identified. Given that this name has intrinsic 
associations with aseity, reflected in the biblical and Jewish traditions, the move 
sustains the concept and allows it to become part of the incarnational account; that he 
is temporally and geographically located in flesh does not negate the fact that he is a 
se, for the Son has life in himself (5:26). Instead, his aseity in union with his humanity 
becomes the basis for salvation. He can lay down his life and take it up again, he can 
nourish and satiate without limit or deterioration, he can lead others into the 
fellowship that existed before the cosmos because he is a se, and because, as such, he 
can engage in such relations with the created world without the normal expectations 
of mortality or deterioration applying. Johannine soteriology, then, is distinctively 
shaped by the ontology of the incarnation: it is not just what Jesus does, but what or 
who he is that determines the shape and course of salvation. Salvation is grounded in 
the ontological identity of the one who declares himself thus: ἐγώ εἰμι. An account of 
christology that fails to reckon with this properly theological ontology is deficient, at 
least with respect to what we find in the Fourth Gospel.43  At the same time, an 
account of theology proper that renders aseity merely in terms of non-contingency, 
and does not complete the statement that “God is from himself” with “from himself 
God gives himself,” falls short of the Fourth Gospel’s recasting of the divine identity.  
Given that the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings are such a prominent structural feature of the 
Fourth Gospel, and given, too, the connections we have seen with the Prologue, a 
final point can be made. What we have outlined in this article is not a minor or 
peripheral strand in Johannine soteriology, a strange trace of Hellenistic metaphysics 
that could easily be excised from the narrative; rather, it is one of the key elements in 
John’s account of salvation. Johannine scholarship should be more attentive to it, and 
to its structuring role in the Gospel as a whole. In turn, this speaks to contemporary 
theology, issuing a reminder that ontological issues cannot be bypassed in our talk of 
the God who names himself, “I am.” 
                                                 
42 Webster, “Life in and of Himself,” 19. 
43  The importance of affirming divine ontology in relation to the incarnation is 
emphasized in John Webster’s later theology. See Michael Allen, “Toward 
Theological Anthropology: Tracing the Anthropological Principles of John Webster,”  
International Journal of Systematic Theology 19 (2017), 6–29, see esp. p.18.   
     
